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1 Introduction
During the midst of the recent ￿nancial crisis, many countries encountered
a severe negative shock to output. Major countries have experienced a sig-
ni￿cant contraction in economic activity. Among them, the drop in Japan
is notably outstanding. Figure 1 displays that the GDP growth rates in the
4th quarter of 2008 and the 1st quarter of 2009 are -10.8% and -17.9% re-
spectively, while those in the United States, the origin country of the recent
￿nancial crisis, are -7.0% and -5.0%. The fact that larger drop was observed
in Japan is very intriguing, since Japan did not face domestic ￿nancial or
economic problems, at least, more severe than the United States during this
time.1
Several thoughts have been raised to understand the global comovements
of the output collapse during the ￿nancial crisis. For example, Caballero and
Kurlat (2009) point out the possibility that the world became excessively
avert to ambiguity reacting to the unprecedented event (the Knightian uncer-
tainty). Devereux and Yetman (2010) stress the importance of international
linkages of ￿nancial institutions and propose a model of the international
1There exist several structural problems, such as societal aging, low productivity growth
and low interest rates. The last point will be discussed below.
2transmission of shocks through de-leveraging across ￿nancial institutions.
They also argue that the traditional trade linkages alone cannot explain the
simultaneous and massive deterioration worldwide. Both, however, do not
o⁄er any theoretical explanation why a country like Japan experienced a
much larger drop in output than the United States during the recent ￿nan-
cial crisis. It naturally becomes an interesting research agenda to investigate
alternative explanations of this particular output collapse. In the context of
this paper, we propose a binding zero lower bound at the onset of the output
collapse in Japan as an alternative explanation.
One distinct feature of the Japanese economy during this time is low
nominal interest rates and in￿ ation expectations. In this paper, we show
that when a small open economy experiences a su¢ ciently large negative
export demand shock, it is vulnerable to falling into a zero bound trap. In
addition, such a shock can have very large impact on the economy compared
to the case when the zero bound is not a binding constraint. We extend the
framework of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Christiano (2004) to the
small open economy, to make these points.
There exist several related studies. Among them, the studies closest to
ours is Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009). They ￿nd that the e⁄ect of
foreign demand shock is signi￿cantly ampli￿ed when the domestic economy
is constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. On the contrary,
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) based on the International Real Business
Cycle (IRBC) model or Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) based on the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model, ￿nd that these are small.
Although the aim of the paper by Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009)
is similar to ours, there are several di⁄erences. First, we use a simple model
calibrated to the Japanese economy. We obtain all results analytically and
therefore intuitive explanation becomes possible. Second, we show that the
shock occurred in the United States during the midst of the recent ￿nancial
crisis is large enough for the Japanese economy again to be constrained by
the zero lower bound. Finally, albeit minor, the small open economy model
is considered instead of the two country model. Concerning the second point
above, Jeanne (2009) also shows that a negative demand shock in one country
can push the world to the global liquidity trap, but does not focus on the
multiplier of the foreign shock.2
Since the export demand shock works similarly to the government ex-
2Jeanne (2009) and Cook and Devereux (2010) examine the role and international
spillover of monetary and ￿scal policy in the global liquidity trap. Fujiwara, Sudo, and
Teranishi (2010) and Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and Teranishi (2010) study the opti-
mal monetary policy cooperation, while Fujiwara and Ueda (2010) investigate the ￿scal
multiplier and spillover, under the global liquidity trap.
3penditure shock, this paper is also closely related to such recent studies on
the ￿scal multiplier under the zero bound as Christiano (2004), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Eggertsson (2010), or Woodford (2010).3
When the economy is caught by the zero lower bound, traditional monetary
policy implemented by means of a interest rate rule has lost any impact on
the real economy. Real interest rates cannot be raised in response to the
￿scal stimulus. As a result, ￿scal multiplier becomes very large. The basic
intuition behind our result is quite analogous to this high ￿scal multiplier
under the zero bound constraint.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the model. Section 3 reports our main results based on the framework of
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). In section 4, we check the robustness of
our main ￿ndings in section 3 by using the alternative methodology proposed
by Christiano (2004). Section 5 concludes.
2 Complete Markets Model
This section describes the model. Our main discussion uses the assumption
that ￿nancial markets are complete. That is, securities are traded contingent
upon every possible state of the world, including the state of the world in
which the zero lower bound on the nominal rate of interest is binding. One
reason we do this, is to clarify the point that the negative consequences of
a binding lower bound do not depend upon ￿nancial market incompleteness.
Another reason is that, as shown by Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005), the technical
analysis of a small open economy is greatly simpli￿ed by the assumption of
complete markets. In particular, it is possible for us to derive all the relevant
results analytically. This is not only because we adopt the assumption of
complete markets, but also because we characterize the scenario in which
the lower bound binds with a suitable adoption of the approach taking in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Because we adopt the assumption of complete markets, it is convenient to
make use of the history notation. That is, let st 2 S denote all the possible
states of the world that can occur in period t. Let
s
t = (s0;s1;:::;st)
3Recent studies such as Braun and Waki (2010) and Braun and K￿rber (2010) have
shown that the multiplier can be biased when the zero lower bound is binding and when
log-linear methods are used to solve the economy. In addition, Erceg and LindØ (2010)
document that the size of ￿scal multiplier critically depends on its timing and how the
expenditure will eventually be ￿nanced. To numerically compute the size of the export
demand multiplier under these settings is left for our future research.
4denote the history up until period t of the realized states of the world. st
is known at time t. We denote the probability of history st by ￿(st). The
set of states, S, contains only two elements. One is associated with a low
level of exports (so low, that the lower bound is binding in equilibrium) and
the other is associated with a ￿ normal￿level of exports. We explain this in
greater detail below.
2.1 Households






















; 0 < ￿ < 1;
where c(st) and N (st) denote consumption and employment in history st,
respectively. The parameter, ￿, corresponds to the subjective discount factor.







































































where W (st) and ￿(st) denote the wage rate and lump sum pro￿ts in st, in
domestic currency units. Also, b(st) denotes the quantity of domestic cur-
rency bonds purchased in st. These bonds pay o⁄ b(st)(1 + R(st)) units
of domestic currency in each history, (st;st+1). The object, bf (st), de-
notes the quantity of foreign currency bonds purchased in st which pay o⁄ ￿
1 + Rf (st)
￿
bf (st) units of foreign currency in each history, (st;st+1). In
the above expression, E (st) denotes the exchange rate (units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency) in history st. The object, B (st+1;st),
is an Arrow security. It is the quantity of domestic currency to be delivered
in period t + 1 if state st+1 is realized, conditional on history, st. The asso-
ciated price is Q(st+1;st). Finally, P c (st) denotes the price of consumption
goods in history st.
The household maximizes utility subject to its budget constraint and
taking as given prices, wages, exchange rates and rates of return.
52.2 Firms

















; " > 1:
Homogeneous good ￿rms take input prices, P (st;i), and output prices, P (st),
as given and beyond their control. The parameter, ", corresponds to the
elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. Pro￿t maximization





























where N (st;i) denotes employment. The real marginal cost of production









The ith monopolist maximizes pro￿ts subject to its demand curve, (1), and
Calvo price frictions. In particular, the monopolist may optimize its price,













The domestic consumption good is produced by a competitive, represen-























; ￿c;!c > 0: (3)
Here, Cd (st) and Cm (st) are the quantities of the domestic homogeneous
good and a foreign imported good used in production. The parameter, ￿c,
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
inputs and !c corresponds to the share of foreign inputs in production. The
price of the input, Cd (st), is P (st). The price of Cm (st), in domestic cur-
rency units, is E (st)P f (st), where P f (st) denotes the price of foreign goods.
















where the numerator in the above expression is the price of exports in foreign
currency units. The parameter, ￿f, corresponds to the elasticity of substitu-
tion of exported goods. The demand for exports is a function of this price,
relative to the foreign goods price.
















Foreign demand takes on a normal value, n, or a low value, l. We assume that
when foreign demand takes on a normal value, the probability of falling to its
low value is ￿. When foreign demand takes on its low value, the probability
of remaining at its normal value is p. We suppose that ￿ is positive, but
extremely small, so that the normal level of export demand is essentially an
absorbing state.
2.3 Market Clearing and Monetary Policy




























Following the argument in Yun (2005), output of the homogeneous domestic













































































Z (st) Z (st) ￿ 0
0 Z (st) < 0
￿
:
As a benchmark analysis, we set ￿ = 0, but later you will see that whether
￿ > 0 or not is irrelevant when computing the multiplier.
2.4 Equilibrium







; v (N) =  
N1+￿
1 + ￿
;  ;￿;￿ > 0:
As appendix A shows the details of the derivation, we log-linearize the
equilibrium conditions about the steady state in which exports are at their
normal level and in￿ ation is zero. The equilibrium conditions in this model
can be summarized by three equations, namely the new Keynesian Phillips









^ Ct = ￿￿￿ (dRt ￿ d￿t+1) + ^ Ct+1; (10)
dRt = max
h
￿r; (1 ￿ ￿)
￿











￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)
; ￿N =
￿



























8q and pc denote steady state values of the real exchange rate, and the relative
price, P c (st)=P (st), respectively.
3 Export Shocks and the Zero Bound Trap
We consider a situation in which ^ Y
f
t 2 f^ Y f;0g, where Y f < 0. When
^ Y
f
t = ^ Y f, ^ Y
f
t returns in subsequent periods to its value of 0 with constant
probability, 1 ￿ p. When ^ Y
f
t = 0, there is a constant probability, ￿, of
transiting to a value of ^ Y f. We set ￿ > 0, but so small that its impact on
the computations can be ignored.
We ￿rst show that with the sizable export demand shock, a small open
economy can fall into the zero bound trap. We, then, show that the export
demand multiplier becomes very large when the economy is constrained by
the zero bound.
3.1 Zero Bound Trap
We follow Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) in conjecturing that the equilib-
rium has the following properties: the lower bound on the nominal rate of
interest is binding as long as ^ Y
f
t < 0, and the equilibrium is characterized
by two sets of values for the variables: steady state immediately upon the
resumption of ^ Y
f
t = 0 and another set of values while ^ Y
f
t < 0. As in Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003), using (9) and (10), we compute the allocations
when ^ Y
f




















where ^ Cl and ￿l denote the deviation of consumption and in￿ ation, respec-
tively, from their steady state values, in the state, ^ Y
f
t = ^ Y f. In the above
expression, we impose the zero bound by setting dRt = ￿r. The above
system is solved as follows:
￿
l =
￿￿￿￿Cr + (1 ￿ p)￿￿XY ^ Y f









9To verify that this is in fact an equilibrium, it is necessary to con￿rm Zl ￿ 0.
From (11), this condition is
Z
l = r + ￿￿p￿
l + ￿Y￿N ^ Ct ￿ 0; (16)
with
(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿C￿￿p > 0: (17)
The latter is the condition to avoid a de￿ationary black hole. As shown in
Eggertsson (2010), when (1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ p)￿￿￿c￿￿p = 0, (14) and (15) become
parallel and no solution exists. Furthermore, if (17) is violated, (12) becomes
positively more steeper than (13).
To test whether the conditions in (16) and (17) are satis￿ed, we simu-
late the model under the calibrated parameters shown in Table 1. Policy
Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Parameters Values Explanation
￿￿ 1.5 Policy parameter on in￿ ation
￿Y 0.5 Policy parameter on output gap
￿ 0.9975 Discount factor
  100.56 Weight on labor disutility
￿ 2.23 Elasticity of labor supply
" 5 Elasticity of substituion among domestic consumer goods
￿c 5 Elasticity of substituion between domestic and foreign goods
￿f 5 Export elasticity to the world demand
￿ 0 or 0.7 Policy parameter on lag
￿ 0.58 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
!c 0.1 Consumption goods import share
￿ 0.75 Calvo parameter
XY 0.14 Export share
rule parameters, ￿￿, ￿Y and ￿,are taken from Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and
Rostagno (2010) on the simulation of the Japanese economy. ￿ and ￿ are
estimated parameters in Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2010). Others are
calibrated: ￿ is set so that the annualized steady state interest rate is 1%;  
is set so that the steady state hours worked is 0.3 (30% of time endowment);
elasticities are set at the standard values with 20% markups and equally ir-
10Figure 2: Zero Bound Region
respective of goods di⁄erences;4 ￿ is also set at the conventional value;5 !c
and XY are calibrated to match the data.
The dots in Figure 2 display the area where conditions (16) and (17) are
satis￿ed in the p-^ Y f diagram. Note ￿rst that no plots with high p means
that this area does not satisfy the condition (17),6 namely
p <
(1 + ￿ + ￿￿C￿￿) ￿
q




Also, ^ Y f must be, at least, as large as -5.5% of the output so that (16)
should hold. This implies that the export demand shock must be sizable so
that a small open economy is caught by the zero bound trap. This result
is in line with the previous studies on the e⁄ect of external shocks such as
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) based on the IRBC model and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005) based on the NOEM model. According to them, the
4This calibration is also employed in the Bayesian estimation of the Japanese economy
by Sugo and Ueda (2008).
5Estimated models usually assume some indexation. Therefore, we calibrate this para-
meter instead of using the estimated value.
6Under the calibrated parameters in Table 1, one root for (1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ p)￿￿￿c￿￿p = 0
is larger than unity.
11multiplier from the foreign technology or demand shock is small. Figure 2
together with Figure 1, however, illustrates that the shock occurred in the
United States during the recent ￿nancial crisis is sizable and large enough to
make the Japanese economy again constrained by the zero bound trap.7
3.2 Export Demand Multiplier
In this section, we show that the export demand multiplier becomes very
large under the zero bound constraint. Appendix A shows that the output




￿￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)
^ Ct + XY ^ Y
f
t ; (18)


























3.2.1 Without Zero Bound
As a reference, we ￿rst compute the multiplier when the zero bound is not a
binding constraint.




^ xt + ￿d￿t+1; (20)
^ xt = ￿
￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)









The output gap, ^ xt, is de￿ned as the deviation of the output from its ￿ exible
price level:8
^ xt = ^ Yt ￿ (XY ￿ ￿) ^ Y
f
t :
(20) and (21) imply that if monetary policy is conducted so that the real
interest rate, dRt ￿ d￿t+1, is set to cancel the natural rate of interest, ^ rn
t ,
namely,
dRt ￿ d￿t+1 = ￿












7The frontier is downward sloping. With higher p, the zero bound period, namely,
recession, becomes longer. Yet, at the same time, this also implies longer periods for zero
interest rate policy. The shape of the frontier is determined by the balance between these
two forces. With di⁄erent policy parameters, the frontier can be upward sloping.
8In an equilibrium where in￿ ation is completely stabilized, or d￿t = ￿d￿t+1, ^ Yt =
(XY ￿ ￿) ^ Y
f
t . This is the output under ￿ exible price equilibrium.
12complete and simultaneous stabilization of in￿ ation and the output gap is
possible. As shown by Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005), the welfare can be ap-
proximated by the quadratic loss function consisting of (domestic producer
price) in￿ ation and the output gap. Therefore, in this economy only with
the export demand shock, complete stabilization of in￿ ation is optimal mon-
etary policy. Under complete price stability, we can obtain the multiplier
analytically. Analytical results under complete price stability are instructive
to understand the mechanism at work and ease comparisons to former stud-
ies on the e⁄ects of foreign variables and on the ￿scal multiplier in the RBC
models. After the intuition behind the basic result is explained, we will later
show the multiplier under the Taylor type rule in (11) via impulse responses.
Under complete price stability, namely










￿XY￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)
1 + ￿
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Since ￿ > 0, the multiplier does not exceed 1. Especially, under the cali-
brated parameters in Table 1, this turns out to be small:
dY
dY f ￿ 0:22: (22)
This small multiplier is consistent with the former ￿ndings on the small ef-
fects of foreign shock as examined in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005). At the same time, it is also related to
the small but positive ￿scal multiplier with the RBC models as examined in
Hall (1980), Barro (1981), and Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992).
Note that complete price stability implies the ￿ exible price model.9 The pos-
itive ￿scal multiplier emerges as a result of reduced consumption or increased
9There exists conceptual di⁄erence between the sticky price model with d￿t = 0; 8t and
the ￿ exible price model. In the former, the price level is constant, while it is indeterminate
in the latter.
13Figure 3: Impulse Responses
marginal utility out of consumption to satisfy the resource constraint. This
leads to an increase in labor e⁄orts through the ￿rst order condition of labor
supply and therefore output. They, however, also show that the multiplier
is small and does not exceed unity in the standard RBC model. According
to the resource constraint in (5), an export demand shock triggers a similar
mechanism as an government expenditure shock. Therefore, the size and
sign of the export demand multiplier under ￿ exible prices in (22) can be
compared with the government spending multiplier obtained in Hall (1980),
Barro (1981), and Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992).
Figure 3 below displays the impulse responses under the Taylor-type rule
in (11) with ￿ = 0:5 and without the zero bound constraint. The export
demand shock, whose size is -1% of the output, is given with AR(1) parameter
being 0.99. Although the initial impact is larger than the case with complete
price stability, the decrease in the output is less than unity even with such
a large negative and persistent shock. Moreover, since the negative export
demand shock acts like the negative cost push shock, large de￿ ation occurs.
In reaction to this, nominal interest rates are lowered for a long period of time.
14This can be compared with the crowding out e⁄ects from ￿scal expenditure.
A large negative (positive) shock is somehow mitigated by lowered (raised)
interest rates. Consequently, output increases, which is also enhanced by an
increase in labor supply due also to the large negative wealth e⁄ects from
the prolonged export demand shock. This exercise with realistic monetary
policy reaction function also demonstrates that the export demand multiplier
is small without the zero bound.
3.2.2 Under Zero Bound
Under the zero bound constraint, the story can be quiet di⁄erent. To under-
stand the intuition behind this, we ￿rst examine the benchmark case when
￿ = 0. Since there is no endogenous state variable, the equilibrium alloca-
tions are derived by solving (12) and (13). Then, with (18), we can show
d ^ Cl
d^ Y f =
￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)p￿￿￿XY
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c) ￿ p￿￿(1 + ￿)
:







￿￿ (1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)
d ^ Cl






p￿￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)
:
When ￿ > 0, the calculations must be done di⁄erently, because a state
variable impacts on economic dynamics when the economy transits out of the
zero bound. Yet, you will see that the multiplier in (23) also represents the
multiplier when ￿ > 0. Conveniently, the state variable, namely, the lagged
interest rate, takes on the same value, regardless of how long the system
has been in the zero bound. We solve for the equilibrium backwards, ￿rst
considering economic dynamics beginning in the period when the economy
emerges from the zero bound, and then considering the situation in the zero
bound.
Let z￿ = ( ^ C￿;￿￿;R￿￿r)0 denote the 3￿1 vector of values taken on by the
endogenous variables in the period that the system emerges from the zero
bound. With z￿ at hand, from (9), (10) and (11), we can compute the values





l + (1 ￿ p)￿
￿￿
+ p ^ C












l + (1 ￿ p)￿
￿￿
: (25)
15Figure 4: Multiplier under the Zero Bound




Namely, z￿ are independent of the endogenous variables under the zero
bound. This leads to our equivalence results, namely that the multiplier
for ￿ = 0 is equal to the multiplier when ￿ > 0. To obtain d ^ Cl=d^ Y f, di⁄er-
entiate (24) and (25), taking into account that the variables with ￿ are not
a function of ^ Y f:
d ^ Cl




d^ Y f ;
d￿l








As a result, the multiplier when ￿ > 0 is also expressed by (23).
Figure 4 shows the multiplier under the zero bound with changing p
until the level to a de￿ ationary black hole. Even when p is very small, the
multiplier is larger than unity. As p becomes larger, the multiplier increases
rapidly. Especially, when p is close to the critical value where the economy
is caught by a de￿ ationary black hole, the size of multiplier becomes as large
as 20.
16The result is consistent with the previous studies in the context of the
external shock given by Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009) or the ￿scal
multiplier under the zero bound constraint discussed by Christiano (2004),
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Eggertsson (2010) and Wood-
ford (2010). Under the zero bound constraint, since traditional monetary
policy via interest rate channel is inactive, there is no endogenous stabiliza-
tion mechanism, which, for example, induces a decrease in real interest rates.
As a result, size of multiplier against the negative export demand shock be-
comes large. Christiano (2004), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009),
Eggertsson (2010) and Woodford (2010) theoretically show that ￿scal policy
can be e⁄ective in such a situation. The detailed discussions as to why the
multiplier is large in the presence of the zero bound are given below.
3.2.3 Discussion
The important equilibrium condition in determining the size of the multiplier





























(27) is derived from the cost minimization problem on (3). q (st) in (28) is
the real exchange rate, derived as a result of complete risk sharing, where ￿
is some constant.
Under the ￿ exible price equilibrium, MC (st) is kept constant. The neg-
ative export demand shock reduces output through both domestic and in-
ternational channels. The former given P c (st)=P (st) in (26) works as fol-
lows: consumption increases via (5); marginal utility out of consumption
decreases; to reduce the marginal disutility from labor, labor supply and
therefore output decrease. The latter given the denominator in the right
hand side variable in (26) works as follows: decrease in the marginal utility
out of consumption leads to depreciation of the real exchange rate (increase
10For the derivation of the below optimality conditions, see Appendix A.
17in q (st)); since ￿C is set larger than unity, this improves the terms on trade
and lowers P c (st)=P (st).11 This also promotes a decrease in output.
When price is sticky, as shown in Figure 3, monetary policy rule also
becomes a crucial factor in determining the size of the multiplier. As analyt-
ically demonstrated by Woodford (2010), if monetary policy keeps constant
real interest rates, then multiplier is unity. According to the standard Euler
equation, the consumption should be kept constant. Therefore, labor sup-
ply must be increased to keep the same level of consumption. On the other
hand, if real interest rates are lowered in reaction to de￿ ation and negative
economic activities, the multiplier signi￿cantly decreases.
When the economy is caught by the zero bound trap. Nominal interest
rates are ￿xed at zero. Therefore, a de￿ ationary pressure stemming from a
negative export demand shock cannot be mitigated by lowered real interest
rates. Following the above arguments made by Woodford (2010), this sig-
ni￿cantly raises the multiplier. This mechanism can be also understood via
(26). When monetary policy via traditional interest rate channel is inactive
under the zero bound, the marginal cost falls in response to a negative export
demand shock. Hence, MC (st) substantially decreases. Consequently, the
multiplier to the export demand shock can be large.
4 Robustness Check
In this section, we test the robustness of above ￿ndings. We compute the dy-
namic multiplier from the export demand shock. Contrary to the experiments
above based on Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), we here follow Christiano
(2004) and do not specify any speci￿c stochastic process. Instead, we assume
that the expected period for the zero bound trap is very long so that agent
believe dRt = ￿r, but the period for the negative export demand shock is
very short. Considering the fact that nominal interest rates have been low
for a long time, this assumption re￿ ect some aspects of the recent Japanese
economic developments.
The equilibrium conditions in (9) and (10) are re-written as
d￿t = ￿^ Yt + ￿^ Y
f
t + ￿d￿t+1; (29)









11Thus, the trade elasticity is very important factor on the e⁄ects of multipliers through
terms of trade. For details, see Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009) and Fujiwara and








; ￿ = XY￿ (￿ ￿ ￿):
We substitute out ^ Ct by using (18). Following Christiano (2004), we solve
this by recursive substitution for (29) and (30) to substitute out d￿t. With
lag operator, (29) and (30) can be transformed into
^ Yt = h(L) ^ Y
f
t +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿L￿1)￿L￿1




￿￿L￿1 + (1 ￿ L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿L￿1)XY




(1 ￿ ￿1L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2L￿1)
(1 ￿ ￿1L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2L￿1)
;
and
￿1 + ￿2 = 1 + ￿ ￿
￿￿
XY
; ￿1￿2 = ￿;
￿1 + ￿2 = 1 + ￿ + ￿￿; ￿1￿2 = ￿;
￿1 < ￿1 < ￿; ￿2 > ￿2 > 1:
As details are shown in Appendix C, if ^ Y
f
t = 1 for t = 1;:::;T ￿1, the export
demand multiplier, dY l=dY f, can be expressed as follows
dY l






























Table 2 below displays the results from (31). We set T ￿ 1 = f1;2;3g,
re￿ ecting the realistic periods of large negative export demand shock observed
in Figure 1. The multiplier from the export demand shock is unity even with
Table 2: Multiplier under Alternative Computation
Periods for negative ^ Y f 1 2 3
dY l=dY f 1.0 1.3 10.7
one time shock. Moreover, it becomes large (10.7) even when the shock
lasts only for three quarters. The results from this alternative computation
also assures the previous conclusion that the external shock can have very
large impacts on the domestic economy when the zero bound is a binding
constraint.
195 Conclusion
When a small open economy experiences a su¢ ciently large negative export
demand shock, it is vulnerable to falling into a zero bound trap. Using a
simple model calibrated for the Japanese economy, we show that the shock
occurred in the United States during the midst of the recent ￿nancial crisis
is large enough to make the Japanese economy again constrained by the zero
lower bound. In addition, we also show that such a shock can have very large
impact on the economy compared to the case when the zero bound is not a
binding constraint. We infer that this could be one possible explanation as
to why a country like Japan experienced much larger drop in output than
the United States during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
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23A Derivation of the Model
The ￿rst subsection below describes the equilibrium conditions. The follow-
ing subsection shows steady states. The last subsection displays the linear
expansion of the equilibrium conditions about steady state.
A.1 Equilibrium Conditions
The household ￿rst order conditions with respect to N (st), B (st+1;st), b(st),










t￿ u0 (C (st+1))












t￿ u0 (C (st+1))(1 + R(st))








t￿ e(st+1)u0 (C (st+1))
￿
1 + Rf (st)
￿

























We assume that foreigners also participate in the markets for B (st). Let
P f;c (st) denote the price of the foreign consumption good. Optimality in the











u0 (Cf (st))(1 + ￿f (st+1))e(st+1)
; (36)
for each st+1;st. Here, Cf (st) denotes foreign consumption, ￿f (st) denotes
the in￿ ation rate in P f;c (st). Implicitly, we assume the foreign agents have
the same utility function, discount rate, and beliefs about the probabilities
















E (st)P f;c (st)
P c (st)
:
A-1In the spirit of our small country analysis, we assume that foreign consump-
tion is constant, independent of st, so that the complete markets condition



































We now turn to optimization by intermediate good ￿rms. The 1 ￿ ￿









where ~ p(st) is the price set by an optimizing intermediate good ￿rm, divided





































































































































According to (43) the demand for the domestically produced input, Cd, is a
decreasing function of the input price, P, relative to the output price, P c.
According to (44), the demand for the imported good, Cm, is also a decreasing
of the input price, EP f;c, relative to the output price. Substituting (43) and


















































(1 ￿ !c) + !c (pc (st)q (st))
1￿￿c





Equality of supply and demand for the homogeneous domestic good implies,



















The 14 variables whose values are determined in equilibrium are
C; F; K; N; X; MC; Y; R; e; p
￿; p
c; q; ￿; ￿
c;
for each possible st. The 14 equilibrium conditions are: (6), (7), (34), (35),
(37), (38), (39), (40), (41), (45), (46), (47), (48), plus monetary policy, (8).
A.2 Steady State
From (7), (8), (34), (35), (38), (39), (40), and (47), we can easily obtain
e = 1; p
￿ = 1; ￿
c = ￿ = 0; R = R




In the equilibrium conditions that we use to solve these variables, there are
two parameters, Y f and ￿, that we do not know how to calibrate. Instead,
A-3we ￿x the consumption and export to output ratios, q and XY, respectively.





With these assumptions, by combining (6), (37), (41), (45), (46), and (48),






























A.3 Log-linear Expansion of Equilibrium Conditions
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions about the steady state in which











1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c ^ qt (50)
^ Xt = ￿f (^ qt + ^ p
c




1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c ^ qt + ^ Y
f
t (51)
^ Yt = ^ Nt (52)
where (51) makes use of (50) and (52) makes use of the log-linearization of
(7). Log-linearizing (48) and making use of (50), (51) and (52) we obtain
























A-4Totally di⁄erentiating (47) and taking (50) into account,
d￿
c




(1 ￿ !c) + !c (pcq)
1￿￿c￿
(1 ￿ !cq1￿￿c)
(^ qt ￿ ^ qt￿1): (54)
Log-linearizing (7), (38), (39), and (40) about steady state implies
d￿t = ￿
￿








The object in square brackets in (55) is the log deviation of marginal cost,
(41), from its steady state value. Substituting out for ^ Nt using (53) and for
^ pc
t using (50) and after rearranging, we obtain
d￿t = ￿
￿





The log-linear approximation of (34) around steady state is:
^ Ct = ￿￿￿ (dRt ￿ d￿t+1) + ^ Ct+1;
where we use (54) and (49)
To compute the equilibrium, one ￿nds ^ Ct, dRt and d￿t that satisfy the
monetary policy rule, (8), (9) and (10). The observation that the equilibrium
for the small open economy may be approximated in this way.
B Equilibrium when ￿ > 0










and represent them in matrix form:
























A-5A solution to this system is a matrix, A, where
zt = Azt￿1;
having the properties that the eigenvalues of A are less than unity and,
￿0A








When we solve this system, we verify that the A matrix with the required
properties is unique. In addition, since the policy rate is the only endogenous






where a is a 3 ￿ 1 column vector. Let z￿ denote the 3 ￿ 1 vector of values
taken on by the endogenous variables in the period that the system emerges










where the ￿ superscript indicates the period upon leaving the zero bound.
Note that z￿ are independent of the endogenous variables under the zero
bound. With z￿ in hand, we can compute the values taken on by the variables
in the lower bound by solving (24) and (25).
C Dynamic Multiplier
Following Christiano (2004), we solve this by recursive substitution for (29)
and (30) to substitute out d￿t. With lag operator, (29) and (30) can be
transformed into
d￿t =
￿^ Yt + ￿^ Y
f
t
1 ￿ ￿L￿1 ;
^ Yt =
￿L￿1
1 ￿ L￿1 (d￿t + r) + XY ^ Y
f
t :
Substituting our d￿t from above two equations lead to
^ Yt = h(L) ^ Y
f
t +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿L￿1)L￿1




￿￿L￿1 + (1 ￿ L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿L￿1)XY
(1 ￿ L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿L￿1) ￿ ￿￿L￿1 :




(1 ￿ ￿1L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2L￿1)
(1 ￿ ￿1L￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2L￿1)
;
where
￿1 + ￿2 = 1 + ￿ ￿
￿￿
XY
; ￿1￿2 = ￿;
￿1 + ￿2 = 1 + ￿ + ￿￿; ￿1￿2 = ￿;
and set
￿1 < ￿1 < ￿; ￿2 > ￿2 > 1:

































By multiplying them, h(L) can be expressed after lengthy but straightfor-
ward algebra as
XYh(L) =















As shown in (19), the aim here is to compute hY f

































































t = 1 for t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1, the export demand multiplier, dY l=dY f,
becomes
dY l

























































1 + ￿ + ￿￿C￿￿ ￿
q
(1 + ￿ + ￿￿C￿￿)
2 ￿ 4￿
2
; ￿2 =
￿
￿1
:
A-8